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Commentary
by
R. David Pittle* and Robert S. Adler**
With the full, rich wisdom of hindsight, the authors have conducted
a critical in-depth analysis of five product liability lawsuits. Their conclusion: despite competent, well-prepared counsel, highly qualified
experts and a skilled, perceptive trial judge, it is not only possible, but
likely, that a typical product liability trial will be more a parody than
a paradigm of justice.
What exactly is the problem? According to the authors, there are
at least six major areas of concern: (a) inadequate and disjointed
product descriptions presented to juries; (b) the early, excessive and
dominant emphasis placed on plaintiffs' injuries which tends to obscure and/or supplant other equally basic elements of the cause of
action; (c) inadequate or obscured identification of product defects;
(d) bypassing proof of the essential elements of causation; (e) poor procedures for evidence gathering, control and preservation; and (f) misuse
of expert witnesses by both sides of lawsuits.
Although we have no effective way to evaluate the authors' conclusions about the problems associated with product liability lawsuits short
of examining cases as closely as the authors have done, we are, nevertheless, reasonably convinced by their study that they have accurately
pinpointed some very real problems.
The authors believe that this unfortunate state of affairs stems,
inter alia, from certain basic weaknesses of procedures of product liability lawsuits. They note that plaintiff's counsel realizes that the jury
is going to be faced with two nearly incomprehensible technological
explanations about the alleged injury-producing product defect that
will be diametrically opposed and dogmatically stated by the conflicting
expert witnesses. Plaintiff's counsel also knows that he is required, as
an indispensable part of proving a cause of action, to present evidence
about the nature and extent of the plaintiff's injury. Juries are always
attentive to this type of evidence and the more shocked or outraged they
become about the plaintiff's injuries the higher the award of damages
is likely to be. Small wonder then that intelligent counsel will focus
* Commissioner, Consumer Product Safety Commission.
00 Special Assistant to R. David Pittle, Consumer Product Safety Commission.
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attention and dwell endlessly on proof of plaintiff's injuries while
minimizing other, more technical, points of the case. Certainly, he must
keep in mind the possibility that his case may be dismissed by the trial
judge or may be reversed by an appellate court should he totally disregard proof of these other elements of the case. As a practical matter,
the authors suggest these dangers are more apparent than real.
In spite of their conclusion that even well-run product liability lawsuits do not really function as they ought to, the authors do not believe
that we should abandon such lawsuits as a determinant forum for
legal liability and economic responsibility for injuries resulting from
dangerous products. Quite the contrary. They firmly state that private
litigation of product liability claims is and will remain a central testing
area of societal needs. They reject the notion that new federal agencies
such as the Consumer Product Safety Commission and the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration will become the predominant societal
solution to the problem of dangerous products. They argue that the
function of these agencies is to develop new levels of manufacture
awareness and consumer acceptability. Furthermore, the validity of
safety standards set by these agencies, according to the authors, will be
ultimately determined, not by the agencies, but by the courts of law
and, more specifically, by private products liability litigation. They
state that:
When agency standards are brought to the courts in the context
of a product liability suit, the courts will be forced to pass on the
adequacy of governmental standards in deciding the issue of unreasonable danger. Thus, in passing on the adequacy of product
design a court is free, in a civil suit, to establish a standard either
more exacting or less onerous than the governmental standard.
This power exercised by the courts in a civil lawsuit can provide
to society independent and objective evaluations of the quality of
the standards and ultimately the overall direction of government
regulation. The product will be exposed in its actual use and environment and be subjected to the evaluation of experts in the
context of a real controversy. Consequently, it appears certain that
the legal system will be presented with early and insistent opportunities to employ the criteria for product safety as crucial elements in the adjudicating process.1
Given their feelings about the utility and desirability of the private
1. Weistein, Twerski, Piehler & Donaher, Product Liability: An Interaction of Law
and Technology, 12 DUQ. L Rv. 463 (1974).
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product liability litigation system, the authors, not surprisingly, have
attempted to formulate solutions to salvage it from its misdirected
course. They present a moderate, carefully reasoned set of proposals
designed to minimize (hopefully, to eliminate) problems with the system. Among the reforms suggested: (a) seriated trials, such that the
product is tried before a jury on the question of whether that product
is unreasonably dangerous prior to the consideration of questions of
causation (did the defect cause harm to the plaintiff) and plaintiff's injuries; (b) fuller participation by experts in all phases of the lawsuit as
well as greater flexibility in the introduction of expert testimony; (c)
insistence upon more carefully preserved physical evidence; and (d)
expansion of pre-trial procedures to more fully and precisely formulate
descriptions of the product and its defects.
Before discussing proposals set forth by the authors which especially
interest us, we feel obligated to address ourselves to their assessment,
previously summarized, of the role played by an agency such as the
Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) in dealing with many
societal problems associated with the existence of unreasonably dangerous products.
It is our impression that the authors, in an effort to stress the importance of the private product liability litigation system, have unwittingly relegated governmental agencies such as CPSC to an unwarranted
subordinate position. We believe that society has at least two important
needs arising from product-related injuries: (1) compensation: the
victim of an injury should be reimbursed for the economic cost of his
injury, and (2) prevention: reasonable steps should be taken to insure
that future product-related injuries will not occur. Few would dispute
the proposition that product liability litigation (or the threat of it) is
the single most important mechanism for serving the first function. It
is far from clear, however, that product liability litigation is adequate
to serve the second and, to society, the more important, function.
In 1970, the President's National Commission on Product Safety,
which was set up by Congress to study the problem of unreasonable
risks of injury associated with products, concluded that 20 million
Americans were injured each year as a result of incidents connected
with consumer products. Of that total, it found that 110,000 persons
were permanently disabled and 30,000 were killed, at an annual cost to
the Nation in excess of 5.5 billion dollars. In its final report to the
President and the Congress, the National Commission found that a
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significant number of these accidents could have been spared if more
attention had been paid to hazard reduction:
Despite its humanitarian adaptations to meet the challenge of
product-caused injuries,
the common law puts no reliable restraint
2
upon product hazards.
We believe that there are several reasons why private product liability litigation can never be the predominant societal mechanism for
reducing unreasonable risks of injury in the marketplace. (1) Product
liability litigation is a post-injury mechanism. It is not triggered until
someone is injured. In many cases, it will not serve a preventive function until many persons have filed or successfully conducted lawsuits.
Thus, there may be an inexcusable delay between the time a dangerous
product enters the marketplace and the time when it is either removed
or rendered less dangerous. (2) In certain instances, manufacturers
may find it less costly to pay damages to victims of products than to
produce safer products. (3) The impact of product liability litigation on
industry is far too haphazard. Companies cannot predict beforehand
the number and extent of injuries that will be caused by their products,
nor can they predict the number of successful lawsuits that will be
brought against them. Accordingly, they may well gamble by producing products that, although cheaper to produce, post high degrees
of hazard. (4) It is often exceedingly difficult to make a reasoned, dispassionate analysis of the risks associated with a product in the context
of a lawsuit (even a seriated one as urged by the authors). Product
liability lawsuits deal mainly with the interaction of one person with
a product at one certain point in time. Even with the reforms suggested by the authors, lawsuits will continue to be "win-lose" propositions. Thus, they do not permit the participants (or the jury) to effectively decide the degree of blame attributable to the victim and to the
product. (5) Litigants in lawsuits generally cannot muster the resources
available to a large governmental agency such as CPSC to properly
conduct in-depth studies of product-related injuries and determine
rational solutions to them. (6) The parties to a lawsuit are concerned
with the particular factual nuances of their case and not with the more
general aspects of risks associated with the product at issue. It is consequently difficult, if not impossible, to generalize about the safety of a
product simply by examining the proceedings of one lawsuit. (7)
2.
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There is no systematic procedural followup from a lawsuit to determine
whether the defect which caused the plaintiff's injury has been corrected.
In contrast to product liability litigation, an agency such as CPSC
has, as its main goal, the mandate, to prevent unreasonable risks of
injury in the marketplace. To accomplish this goal, Congress gave
CPSC the authority to: (1)issue public warnings about product hazards; (2) to require companies to meet mandatory safety standards including: (a) requirements as to the performance composition, contents,
design, construction, finish or packaging of consumer products or (b)
requirements that a consumer product be marked with or accompanied
by clear and adequate warnings or instructions, or requirements respecting the form of warnings or instructions; (3) to administratively
ban products from the marketplace where no safety standard would
adequately protect the public; or (4) to declare products to be imminent
hazards and seek injunctions in United States district courts without
the necessity of administrative proceedings.
In addition, the Consumer Product Safety Act requires every manufacturer of a consumer product and every distributor and retailer of
such product who obtains information which reasonably supports the
conclusion that such product contains a defect, which could create a
substantial product hazard, to immediately inform CPSC of such defect.
A final preventive measure of the Consumer Product Safety Act authorizes CPSC to prescribe procedures to insure that the manufacturer
of any new consumer product furnishes notice and a description of
such product to the Commission before its distribution in commerce.
This legislative authority, coupled with a computerized injury collection system which allows CPSC to determine the relative degree of
hazards associated with most consumer products, enables CPSC to attack the problem of unreasonably dangerous products in an organized
and systematic fashion.
In summary it is our feeling that despite the impact which product
liability litigation has had in promoting safety consciousness among
companies, it is not structured to prevent accidents in the manner that
a governmental agency such as CPSC is.
We do not, of course, intend our remarks to be construed as indicating that product liability litigation is inconsistent or competitive
with governmental regulation. The Consumer Product Safety Act
specifically authorizes lawsuits by persons who sustain injury by reason
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of any knowing violation of a consumer product safety rule (i.e., a safety
standard or product ban), or any other rule or order issued by the Commission, for damages sustained and the cost of the suit, including a
reasonable attorney's fee. The Act specifically states that this cause of
action is in addition to and not in lieu of any other remedies provided
by common law or under federal or state law.
Insofar as the authors have been tentative in suggesting proposals
for reform of the product liability system, it is difficult for us to do
other than raise questions for them to consider as they continue with
their analysis:
a) Seriated Trials: The authors suggest that it may be prejudicial to
permit an injured plaintiff even to be present during the first segment
of a trial in which the question of whether the product is or is not unreasonably defective is being presented to the jury. Their reasoning is
as follows: if the jury views a severely injured plaintiff, it may be
moved, out of feelings of sympathy, to award damages to him even
where the product clearly was not at fault. We question the propriety
and practicality of such a proposal. The plaintiff is certainly one of
the persons most seriously affected by the outcome of the trial. To bar
him from the proceedings while any other member of the public is
permitted to attend strikes us as demeaning and unfair. Query: if the
plaintiff's injuries are not visible, may he then attend the first stage of
the trial? If so, must a determination be made of whether or not plaintiff's injuries are sufficiently gruesome to prevent him from attending
the first stage of trial? What arrangements will be made to insure that
the plaintiff can at least listen to the proceedings? Should the plaintiff
be able to view the trial? What would the authors suggest where testimony from the plaintiff is held necessary-that a severely injured plaintiff testify during the first stage of a seriated trial to a blindfolded jury
so that the plaintiff's injuries could not be viewed?
On the other hand, if a severely injured plaintiff is permitted to
attend the first stage of a seriated trial, does his presence render nugatory the effectiveness of seriation?
We also question whether the seriation of a trial will truly result in
a more relevant dispassionate inquiry about the defectiveness of a
product. Is it not equally likely that, instead of injury gamesmanship
by plaintiff's counsel, we will now have technical gamesmanship by
defendant's counsel? That is, the defendant may well deliberately introduce endless technical evidence into the trial to confuse the jury
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sufficiently to the extent that their determination is simply problematical.
Further, the net effect of seriated trials, as we view the situation,
may well be to reduce the number of instances in which plaintiffs are
successful in lawsuits. Even assuming that greater justice to defendants
rather than less justice to plaintiffs is the result, we wonder about the
impact on society of this situation. Will this be a significant reduction
in incentive for companies to promote safety?
Additionally, we note that, for good or ill, seriated trials will likely
tend to negate the "deep pocket" approach (i.e., let those most able
to pay for injuries, such as corporate defendants, be the ones to pay)
sometimes taken by juries. This, of course, is what the authors would
hope to have happen. The net effect of this situation may be to shift
the costs of an injury in many marginal liability situations from a large
corporation to the injured individuals or to society at large (if plaintiffs are rendered bankrupt and must seek publicly financed medical
benefits). Instead of higher prices for products we may then be paying
higher taxes to support more public medical facilities.
Finally, we note the failure of the authors to pursue alternative solutions to the injury gamesmanship played by plaintiff's counsel. If juries
are so easily swayed from proper consideration of the elements of a
product liability lawsuit, might it not be expedient to abolish them
and set up panels of experts trained in product liability law to judge
complex cases? Or might it not be preferable to have product liability
courts in which a judge (or panel of judges) would decide these cases
in a more academic, less emotional manner?
These are all questions which we hope the authors will address in
further analysis of their thoughts.
b) Expert Witnesses: We do not question the wisdom of the authors'
reform proposals for revamping the use of experts at trials. We do,
however, question the practicality of certain such proposals. The authors, for example, suggest that experts be present during pre-trial
discussions. They correctly state that experts can significantly aid in
the identification and analysis of product defects at this stage of litigation. They also correctly point out that the relevance of experts' qualifications can be decided during those pre-trial phases. It is difficult to
criticize such proposals as unwise. However, the authors have not explained how it will be possible to get experts willing to spend time in
all of the many phases of a trial without being paid extremely large
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sums of money. Should it be required that experts be available during
all phases of a trial, it is likely that the party most harmed by this requirement will be the indigent plaintiff.
The authors also suggest a restructuring of the method of presenting
testimony by experts. They suggest that experts testify in the form of
narrative rather than in response to hypothetical questions. It is difficult to assess such a proposal absent practical experience. It strikes us
as somewhat unrealistic to expect that lawyers, who will be counseling
experts on how to testify, will allow their experts the latitude which
the authors urge for expert testimony. After all, there is a reason for the
posture that most experts take in presenting testimony. Lawyers know
that the slightest amount of doubt or hesitancy on the part of an expert
will be fully exploited by counsel for the other side to show lack of
knowledge or conviction by the expert. It remains to be seen whether
a change in the form of expert testimony will, in fact, result in more
helpful expert testimony.
A further point which the authors might consider in this area would
be the use of experts appointed and paid for by the court, should the
court determine that such is necessary. An expert responsible only to
the court would be able to assess testimony of the party's expert witnesses and give his own evaluation which need not be presented in as
dogmatic a manner as the testimony from experts hired by one or the
other side (perhaps the fee paid to the court's expert would be assessed
against the losing party).
c) Preservationof Evidence: We believe that the authors' suggestions
for reforms in this area constitute more a hope than a realistic proposal.
Certainly, no one could dispute the fact that it is essential to have carefully preserved physical evidence in a products liability case. It is a
relatively easy matter to rule that cases in which it is impossible to
properly evaluate physical evidence should not be tried. Our problem
with such a rule is that, as applied, it could be used to penalize poor,
uneducated persons who did not realize that care should have been
taken to preserve evidence of a product that injured them. To deny
these persons a day in court because they have not taken steps, which
from hindsight seem reasonable, is to make the judicial system less
responsive to very serious problems than we would like. Unfortunately,
the world is not structured so that accidents involving products (or any
other thing for that matter) occur in a clearly reproducible, easily provable, manner. At the risk of sounding dogmatic, we should state as a
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general rule that the legal system should adapt to the needs of litigants
and not vice versa. Obviously, this is not a problem which lends itself
to generalized solutions.
Our overall assessment of the authors' article is that they have done
a remarkable job of precipitating out a set of factors to characterize a
very complex interaction of law and technology. We applaud their
efforts although we have mild misgivings about the possible ramifications of their proposed solutions. The plaintiff's case, which is already
a difficult matter to prove, may well become even more difficult to
prove utilizing such proposals, thereby reducing the social effectiveness
of such trials. We hope the authors will consider these aspects in their
future research the results of which we need and eagerly await.
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